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MATHEMATICAL MONSTERS
ANDREW ABERDEIN∗
Monsters lurk within mathematical as well as literary haunts. I propose to trace
some pathways between these two monstrous habitats. I start from Jeffrey Jerome
Cohen’s influential account of monster culture and explore how well mathematical
monsters fit each of his seven theses (Cohen 1996). The mathematical monsters
I discuss are drawn primarily from three distinct but overlapping domains. I will
describe these in much greater detail as they arise below, but here is a brief preview.
Firstly, late nineteenth-century mathematicians made numerous unsettling discov-
eries that threatened their understanding of their own discipline and challenged
their intuitions. The great French mathematician Henri Poincaré characterised
these anomalies as ‘monsters’, a name that stuck. Secondly, the twentieth-century
philosopher Imre Lakatos composed a seminal work on the nature of mathematical
proof, in which monsters play a conspicuous role (Lakatos 1976). He reconstructs
the emergence during the nineteenth century of a proof of the Euler Conjecture,
which ascribes a certain property to polyhedra.1 Lakatos coined such terms as
‘monster-barring’ and ‘monster-adjusting’ to describe strategies for dealing with
entities whose properties seem to falsify the conjecture. Thirdly, and most recently,
mathematicians dubbed the largest of the so-called sporadic groups ‘the Monster’,
because of its vast size and uncanny properties, and because its existence was sus-
pected long before it could be confirmed.2
1. ‘The monster’s body is a cultural body’
For Cohen, the monster is ‘an embodiment of a certain cultural moment—of
a time, a feeling, and a place’ (Cohen 1996, 4). This poses two immediate ques-
tions: what, if anything, constitutes a cultural moment for mathematicians and can
mathematics be embodied? The philosopher Brendan Larvor argues that mathe-
matical practices should be understood as cultural since ‘they are reproduced non-
biologically, they are shared activities mediated by material artefacts, and they
express norms and values’ (Larvor 2016, 18). However, the question of what con-
stitutes a cultural moment for mathematicians is a fraught one. Is the culture in
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question the culture at large, as bolder historians and sociologists of mathematics
would insist? Is it rather the culture of mathematicians’ institutions, universities,
learned societies, funding bodies and so forth, as other, more cautious sociologists
and historians maintain? Or is there a purely mathematical culture comprised of
the mathematicians and their interactions, proceeding more or less independently
of the wider world? Or perhaps many such cultures, divided by mathematical spe-
cialism or geographical contingency? Or is the mathematician of no culture, his
idiosyncrasies attributable only to his peculiar genius, to the psychology of the
individual?
Some of the conflict between these various positions can be illustrated by a
classic debate between a sociologist, David Bloor, and a philosopher, John Worrall,
over the status of the mathematical monsters discussed by Lakatos. Bloor, in his
splendidly titled article ‘Polyhedra and the abominations of Leviticus’ (Bloor 1978)
links the responses of nineteenth-century mathematicians to ‘monstrous’ polyhedra
to the fourfold classification of cultures devised by the anthropologist Mary Douglas:
hierarchical, enclavist, individualistic, or isolate. As she explains,
one is based on hierarchical community, and so in favour of for-
mality and compartmentalization; one is based on equality within
a group, and so in favour of spontaneity, and free negotiation, and
very hostile to other ways of life; one is the competitive culture of
individualism; and fourth is the culture of the isolate who prefers
to avoid the oppressive controls of the other forms of social life
(Douglas 1996, 42).3
Bloor traces the following sequence during the era in which proofs of Euler’s Con-
jecture were under development: ‘Eighteenth-century corporate universities’ (en-
clavist) −→ ‘Intended result of [Prussian university] reforms of 1812’ (hierarchical)
−→ ‘Actual result of reforms by 1840: a competitive structure’ (individualistic)
(Bloor 1978, 265). Each of these historical contexts corresponds to one of Dou-
glas’s four kinds of culture and is thereby associated with a method for dealing
with monsters. Happily enough, the work which Lakatos saw as first exemplifying
the most successful methodological response to the monster, which Bloor associates
with an individualistic culture, appeared in 1847 (although in Munich, not Prussia,
as Bloor concedes).
The difficulty with such a picture, of course, is that individual mathematicians
do not necessarily fit. Mathematicians may share identical circumstances and yet go
about their work in very different ways. Replying to Bloor, Worrall notes Poincaré’s
comment on his older compatriots Charles Hermite and Joseph Bertrand: ‘They
were scholars of the same school at the same time; they had the same education,
they were under the same influences; and yet what a difference!’ (Worrall 1979, 76,
quoting Poincaré 1913, 211). Of Poincaré himself, Worrall complains that ‘it just
seems grossly implausible that a genius like Poincaré, who was engaged in critical
and immensely fruitful debates on a variety of subjects with a variety of scientists,
3Bloor employs Douglas’s earlier account of this taxonomy in terms of high or low ‘grid’ and
‘group’, where grid measures the strength of a society’s internal hierarchies and group measures
the strength of its barrier with the rest of the world. Hence hierarchists are high grid, high group;
enclavists are low grid, high group; individualists are low grid, low group; and isolates are high
grid, low group.
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should have been simply reflecting his social circumstances in responding to poly-
hedra’ (Worrall 1979, 78). But there is nothing simple about it. Poincaré’s genius
led him to results that perhaps no other mathematician of his era could have found.
Nonetheless, his social circumstances, including debates with his peers, helped to
shape and direct that genius. Likewise, Hermite and Bertrand may have had much
in common, but they also had significant differences, not just in their temperaments
but also in their respective networks of collaboration.4 Douglas’s later work contains
an implicit response to Worrall’s challenge: the fourfold classification describes not
only cultures, but also how individuals may accept or react against the prevailing
culture (Douglas 1996, 44 ff.). Different mathematicians may be expected to ac-
cept or reject the various cultures of which they are a part to differing degrees. An
applied mathematician, whose research is driven by the needs of science or indus-
try, may reflect some cultural aspects more explicitly than a pure mathematician
whose research is curiosity driven. A mathematician with many collaborators or
students will belong to a culture of research in a different way from a more isolated
contemporary. But a mathematician who stood entirely outside of all such cultures
would be a monster indeed.5
Worrall also suggests that ‘Bloor was perhaps misled by Lakatos’s terminology:
“monster” is, of course, a technical term in biology’ (Worrall 1979, 78). Indeed the
appropriation of this biological terminology did not begin with Lakatos, but with
Poincaré:
Logic sometimes makes monsters. Since half a century we have
seen arise a crowd of bizarre functions which seem to try to re-
semble as little as possible the honest functions which serve some
purpose. No longer continuity, or perhaps continuity, but no deriv-
ative, etc. . . . If logic were the sole guide of the teacher, it would
be necessary to begin with the most general functions, that is to
say with the most bizarre. It is the beginner that would have to be
set grappling with this teratologic museum (musée tératologique)
(Poincaré 1913, 435 f.).
But what is a teratologic museum? Since the late eighteenth century, anatomists
began to assemble collections of ‘monsters’, developmentally anomalous human and
animal foetuses. Poincaré’s father was a professor of medicine, so we can assume
that he had firsthand experience of such collections. More strikingly, ‘teratology’
itself, an unambiguously technical term in biology that literally means ‘the study of
monsters’, was coined by Poincaré’s grandfather-in-law.6 So Lakatos and Poincaré
are clearly using ‘monster’ in the biological sense of an anomalous case that resists
classification. That would be a problem for Bloor’s application of Douglas (let alone
my application of Cohen) if this sense of monster was unrelated to the latter’s work.
4For example, Hermite (but not Bertrand) took a close interest in contemporary German
mathematics (Ferreirós 2016, 225).
5By a further irony, Poincaré was himself once described as a ‘monster of mathematics’
(Dieudonné 1973, 52). We might more naturally refer to him as a prodigy although, of course,
‘prodigy’ also means monster.
6The naturalist Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire introduced the term to describe the study of
congenital malformations, a research field initiated by his father, Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire
(Blumberg 2009, 26). The two men were respectively grandfather and great-grandfather of Louise
Poulain d’Andecy, Poincaré’s wife (Rollet 2012, 20).
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But, this is precisely what Douglas (and, as we shall see, Cohen) stresses the most
(see, for example, Douglas 1996, 126).
We have seen that mathematical practices take place within cultural contexts,
but not that they are embodied. Surely mathematics is purely a matter of the mind?
In a recent paper entitled ‘The materiality of mathematics’, the sociologist of math-
ematics Christian Greiffenhagen argues otherwise: ‘writing (on paper, blackboards,
napkins, beermats, or even in the air) and the development of representational tech-
niques are indispensable for doing and thinking mathematics’ (Greiffenhagen 2014,
505). The truths of mathematics may be culture-independent, but the cultural
process whereby mathematicians arrive at them and demonstrate their truth surely
is not. This distinction may be especially important for monsters. As objects
of mathematics they have the same status as any other equally well-established
mathematical object. But what makes them monsters is their intersection with the
specific mathematical culture that gave rise to them: ‘anomalies are not installed
in nature but emerge from particular features of classificatory schemes’ (Douglas
1996, 126). Characteristically, they are monsters because they represent an affront
to the intuitions of the mathematicians who discover them. Those intuitions are
unavoidably cultural. In this sense, the monster’s body is indeed a cultural body.
2. ‘The monster always escapes’
‘No monster tastes of death but once’, as Cohen has it (Cohen 1996, 5). This
is one of the most immediately recognisable traits of the monsters of film and
folklore. As Buffy says to Dracula ‘You think I don’t watch your movies? You
always come back’ (Noxon 2000, 38′00′′). Some mathematical monsters exhibit
similar behaviour. For example, many of the monsters discussed by Lakatos were
forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, re-rediscovered, reinterpreted, explained
away, before they were finally put to good use. To see how this could happen we
need to investigate the story Lakatos tells.
Polyhedra have been studied since antiquity.7 In the seventeenth century the
mathematician and philosopher René Descartes noted a property that all polyhedra,
regular and irregular, seem to share. A century later the mathematician Leonhard
Euler made the same observation, and put it into the form by which it is now
best known: V − E + F = 2, where V is the number of vertices, E the number
of edges, and F the number of faces. The claim that this equation holds for every
polyhedron is the Euler Conjecture. It clearly holds for tetrahedra (4− 6 + 4 = 2),
cubes (8 − 12 + 6 = 2), and the other regular polyhedra, and for many other
7Whereas polygons are plane figures bounded by straight edges, such as triangles, rectangles,
or pentagons, polyhedra are their three-dimensional analogues: three-dimensional shapes with
planar surfaces bounded by straight edges. Regular polyhedra are polyhedra all of whose faces are
regular (that is, equiangular and equilateral) polygons. They are five in number: the tetrahedron,
comprised of four equilateral triangles; the cube, of six squares; the octahedron, of eight equilateral
triangles; the dodecahedron, of twelve pentagons; and the icosahedron, of twenty equilateral
triangles. Players of tabletop roleplaying games will recall these as the d4, d6, d8, d12, and d20
dice, respectively. The proof that there can be only five such objects is pleasingly straightforward
(ask yourself what the angles at the corners of each of the regular polygons are and how many
of each could meet at a point). It is the last proposition of the last book of Euclid’s Elements,
the most celebrated of mathematical textbooks (Heath 1908, XIII.18, 1190). Of course, not all
polyhedra are regular. Roleplaying enthusiasts will also recall the d10, whose sides are kite-shaped,
and perhaps the d30, with rhombus-shaped sides. More generally still, there are prisms, not all
of whose sides are the same, and other figures assembled from various shapes in all sorts of ways.
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examples besides. But just listing positive cases does not comprise a proof. A
mathematical proof should establish that a theorem is true without exception. But
as proofs of the conjecture emerged, so did apparent counterexamples. Throughout
the nineteenth century numerous proofs of the conjecture were attempted, only to
fall to counterexamples not anticipated by their authors. A final proof was not
established until the very end of the century.
The Euler Conjecture may seem to be a mere mathematical curiosity. Nonethe-
less, the history of its attempted proofs is the subject of a masterpiece of the
philosophy of mathematics: Proofs and Refutations is a singular book. It is struc-
tured as a dialogue, apparently taking place in a classroom, but in which the pupils,
identified only by Greek letters, act as mouthpieces for the contrasting methodolog-
ical tendencies of many of the nineteenth-century mathematicians who tangled with
the Euler Conjecture. Meanwhile, the actual history unfolds in the footnotes.8 As
Lakatos reconstructs the story, the interruptions from monster polyhedra, appar-
ent counterexamples to the conjecture, eventually led mathematicians to revise the
concepts in which the conjecture was couched. Essentially, they came to realise that
they had not really understood what a polyhedron was when they began searching
for a proof. En route to this realisation, many different strategies are tried on for
size. These strategies worked to exclude, reinterpret, or otherwise kill off monster
polyhedra. But the monsters kept escaping—or new monsters appeared to take
their place.
The first monster to make an appearance is the hollow cube: ‘a solid bounded
by a pair of cubes’ (Lakatos 1976, 13). Since for each cube V −E+F = 2, then for
both taken together as a single object V −E+F = 4. In the historical record, this
was first published in 1813 as a counterexample to Augustin Cauchy’s 1811 ‘proof’,
then overlooked, then rediscovered in 1832. In Lakatos’s dialogue, the hollow cube
provokes the following response:
But why accept the counterexample? . . . Why should the theorem
give way, when it has been proved? It is the ‘criticism’ that should
retreat. This pair of nested cubes is not a polyhedron at all. It
is a monster, a pathological case, not a counterexample (Lakatos
1976, 14).
This response, ‘monster-barring’ to which I will return in §4, provokes a series
of monsters, for each of which a further monster-barring redefinition is proposed.
Many of these examples have a history of appearance, disappearance, and reappear-
ance. For example, the picture frame (16− 32− 16 = 0), Fig. 1, was first published
alongside the hollow cube in 1813 (with a note from the journal’s editor stating
that he already knew of it), but was then overlooked in works published in 1827
and 1858 (Lakatos 1976, 19). Other monster polyhedra included twin polyhedra
(conjoined at a vertex or an edge), stellated polyhedra (with star-shaped faces),
and the crested cube (a cube with a smaller cube stuck to one face).
Nor is monster-barring the only way to make monsters disappear. Lakatos also
discusses monster-adjustment: where the monster-barrer revises definitions until
the monster is no longer a polyhedron, the monster-adjuster revises definitions
until the monster is no longer a monster. For the monster-adjuster,
8Or not: even in the footnotes, Lakatos plays somewhat fast and loose with the historical
record (Corfield 2003, 152).
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Figure 1. The picture frame, fugitive non-Eulerian polyhedron?
Monsters don’t exist, only monstrous interpretations. One has to
bar one’s mind from perverted illusions, one has to learn how to see
and how to define correctly what one sees. [Monster-adjustment]
is therapeutic: where you—erroneously—‘see’ a counterexample, I
teach you how to recognise—correctly—an example. I adjust your
monstrous vision (Lakatos 1976, 31).
In some cases, the monster is merely an illusion, a misreading, in which case
monster-adjustment may well be the best remedy. But the danger of this ap-
proach is that it does not explain, but only explains away. Where monsters are
symptoms of deeper problems with the conjecture, monster-adjustment postpones
the eventual recognition and remedy of these problems.
A corollary that Cohen draws from the fugitive nature of monsters is that ‘mon-
strous interpretation . . . must content itself with fragments’ (Cohen 1996, 6). This
too is familiar from the culture of mathematical monsters. Consider these reflec-
tions on the Monster group (to which we shall return in §6):
These things are so beautiful. It’s such a pity that people can’t
see them. I mean, it’s a kind of beauty that exists in the abstract,
but we poor mortals will never see it. We can just get vague
glimmerings. . . . Well, I mean, I know all the theorems. But
there’s still something that to me is unknown, unknowable. . . .
Especially with the Monster, and I keep saying that it makes me
sad that I’ll probably never understand it (Roberts 2015, 264).
This is John Conway, a mathematician who is as much of an expert on the Monster
group as anyone. His words may seem like false modesty, until one appreciates that
the Monster group has more than 8 × 1053 members. Where Conway has ‘vague
glimmerings’, Cohen refers to ‘footprints, bones, talismans, teeth, shadows, ob-
scured glimpses’ as ‘signifiers of monstrous passing that stand in for the monstrous
body itself’ (Cohen 1996, 6). Mathematicians deal with different sorts of signifier
from monster hunters, but they often have a similar task: to infer the properties of
something they can only grasp in the most indirect fashion.
3. ‘The monster is the harbinger of category crisis’
Cohen’s third thesis grounds his second: ‘The monster always escapes because
it refuses easy categorization’ (Cohen 1996, 6). This makes it ‘dangerous, a form
suspended between forms that threatens to smash distinctions’ (ibid.). We have
already seen some small-scale examples of this tendency at work in mathematics:
the monster polyhedra disrupted early attempts to impose an easy categorization.
Allusions to monsters also arise in much more fundamental areas of mathematical
work. An early example occurs in the origins of the calculus. Although Newton
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and Leibniz pioneered the study of rates of change of functions in the seventeenth
century, their work relied upon the use of infinitesimal quantities, for which no con-
sistent basis was then known. This was subject to criticism from an early date, but
a consistent foundation was not presented until the nineteenth century. The most
astute early critic of the calculus, the philosopher and churchman George Berkeley,
characterized infinitesimals in monstrous terms: they were the ‘ghosts of departed
quantities’ (Berkeley 1734, 81). Much more recently, the infinitesimal has been
rehabilitated, using modern mathematical techniques far beyond those available in
the seventeenth century. Although the soundness of this work is beyond dispute,
not all mathematicians find it worthwhile. Indeed, some of them have criticized the
new infinitesimals in terms strikingly similar to those once used against the old—
notably the distinguished French mathematician Alain Connes, who has referred to
them as ‘chimeras’ (Kanovei et al. 2013, 287). Although ghosts and chimeras are
monsters of rather different pedigree, Berkeley and Connes are complaining about
a property they share: resistance to categorization. The ghost is sometimes there
and sometimes not; the chimera is a jumble of properties from different creatures.
A more fundamental category crisis arose in the nineteenth-century mathematics
required for the rigorization of the calculus. Many concepts that had been hitherto
given only informal definitions were replaced by formal explications, but it turned
out—alarmingly—that the newly redefined concepts did not fit together in the same
way as their pre-formal antecedents. The irony was that dispatching one generation
of monsters had given rise to another. As the mathematician and philosopher
Solomon Feferman notes, ‘one service that the monsters lurking around the corners
provide is forcing us to don such armor [of rigorous proof] for our own protection.
But if the proofs themselves produce such monsters, then the significance of what
is proved requires closer attention’ (Feferman 2000, 328).
Crucially, mathematicians had assumed that continuity and differentiability were
properties of more or less the same functions. Informally, a function is continuous
if it doesn’t have any ‘jumps’—that is, if its output only makes big changes when
its input makes big changes—and it is differentiable whenever it has a derivative,
that is when its rate of change can be determined. Functions that are differentiable
at every point must be continuous. Intuitively, it may seem as though the converse
should also be true, that continuous functions must be everywhere differentiable.
This cannot be so, because there are some functions with isolated non-differentiable
points, known as singularities, such as cusps or ‘sharp corners’, that lack tangents.
But it had been assumed that such functions would only have comparatively few,
isolated singularities. Indeed, the French mathematician André-Marie Ampère pub-
lished what he took to be a proof of this result in 1806.
However, starting in the 1830s, mathematicians began to turn up functions that
were continuous but nowhere differentiable (for details, see Thim 2003; Volkert
2008; Smoryński 2012). The Czech mathematician Bernard Bolzano was the first
to demonstrate the existence of such a function, although his result remained in
manuscript until long after his death (and long after similar results had been derived
by others). The first published continuous but nowhere differentiable function is
due to Karl Weierstrass, in a lecture given in 1872 and published in 1875. His
function has the form
W (x) =
∞∑
k=0
ak cos(ckπx)
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where 0 < a < 1, ab > 1 + 3π/2 and b > 1 an odd integer. As may be seen from
Fig. 2, it is loosely sinusoidal, but between each summit the curve follows a smaller
scale sinusoidal path, and between the summits of that path an even smaller scale
sinusoidal path, and so on, ad infinitum. It is this last clause that is crucial: the
curve stays just as detailed however much we magnify it.
- 2 - 1 1 2
x
- 2
- 1
1
2
f (x)
Figure 2. Plot of Weierstrass function over the interval [−2, 2],
with detail enlarged. (Adapted from https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Weierstrass_function.)
Self-similarity at ever smaller scales is a hallmark of an important class of fractals,
a type of function which received a lot of attention in the late twentieth century,
in part because increasing computer speeds made visualization of such functions
feasible. Indeed the very word ‘fractal’ is new—it was coined by Benôıt Mandel-
brot as recently as 1975. While the classification of fractals is still an on-going
project, and controversial in some details, they now have a clearly established place
in mathematics. This was not the case at the time of Bolzano’s and Weierstrass’s
discoveries, as Poincaré’s animadversions against the exhibits of the ‘teratologic
museum’ demonstrate. This suggests a point of contrast with the monsters anal-
ysed by Cohen, for whom ‘the monster’s very existence is a rebuke to boundary
and enclosure’, its geography ‘always a contested cultural space’ (Cohen 1996, 7).
Progress in mathematics often consists in mapping that geography, resolving these
contests, and constructing new monster-proof enclosures. (Of course, new monsters
tend to arise to test the new boundaries.)
4. ‘The monster dwells at the gates of difference’
‘The exaggeration of cultural difference into monstrous aberration is familiar
enough’, as Cohen reminds us (Cohen 1996, 7). The most obvious mathematical
counterpart to this xenophobic tendency in monster reception is Lakatos’s method
of monster-barring, which we encountered in §2. He characterizes it, somewhat
pejoratively, as follows:
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Using this method one can eliminate any counterexample to the
original conjecture by a sometimes deft but always ad hoc redefi-
nition of the polyhedron, of its defining terms, or of the defining
terms of its defining terms. We should somehow treat counterex-
amples with more respect, and not stubbornly exorcise them by
dubbing them monsters (Lakatos 1976, 23).
Monster-barring is not confined to mathematics—similar techniques for winning
arguments by manipulating definitions to exclude troublesome counterexamples are
familiar from other contexts, under other names—some of which also allude to the
xenophobic possibilities of monster-barring. For example, the ‘no true Scotsman’
move, in which the monster is barred by splitting the contested concept into ‘true’
cases and others (Flew 1975, 47). Thus the chauvinistic Scotsman may reconcile
his belief that ‘No true Scotsman takes sugar with his porridge’ to the existence of
an apparent sugared-porridge-eating Scotsman, by dismissing the latter as no true
Scotsman.
Bloor also brings out the scapegoating aspects of monster-barring, linking it to
the anomaly response of
Pollution-conscious societies [that] . . . survive by the threat of ex-
pulsion, or suffer repeated schism. They are frequently subject to
outside threat and consequently their whole system of classification
is pervaded by the dichotomy between the good inside and the evil
and perverted outside. They need to exercise and symbolize high
group control (Bloor 1978, 253).
Worrall complains of this link that ‘Bloor’s argument . . . seems to depend quite
heavily on there being an emotional component to “monster-barring”, that it should
involve “turning in disgust” from alleged counter-examples. But of course this emo-
tional component is by no means essential’ (Worrall 1979, 78). Not essential, but by
no means absent either: Lakatos quotes Hermite reacting to the functions discussed
in the last section, ‘I turn aside with a shudder of horror from this lamentable plague
of functions which have no derivatives’ (quoted in Lakatos 1976, 19). It is significant
that Lakatos is quoting from private correspondence, published posthumously; per-
haps Hermite would have been more circumspect if writing for publication. This
reflects the sociologist Erving Goffman’s distinction between the ‘front’ and the
‘back’ of cultural practices: the former intended for public consumption; the latter
for private cooperation (Goffman 1959, 114). Some commentators have found this
reflected in mathematical practice. Thus Reuben Hersh distinguishes ‘mathematics
in “finished” form, as it is presented to the public in classrooms, textbooks, and
journals’ from ‘mathematics as it appears among working mathematicians, in in-
formal settings, told to one another in an office behind closed doors’ (Hersh 1991,
128). A proper understanding of mathematical culture must attend to both of these
contexts but the front, intended as it is for a wider audience, is always the more
accessible. Bearing this practical distinction in mind, we may reflect that it is more
remarkable that there is any trace of an emotional component to an apparently
affectless problem-solving technique, than that it is not seen in every case.
Resort to monster-barring represents one crude conclusion that may be drawn
from the presence of monsters: the monster must be excluded by whatever means
necessary. Just as crudely, we could take the monsters to show that the whole ba-
sis of arriving at distinctions is radically unsound: ‘By revealing that difference is
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arbitrary and potentially free-floating, mutable rather than essential, the monster
threatens to destroy . . . the very cultural apparatus through which individuality is
constituted and allowed’ (Cohen 1996, 12). A spokesman for this perspective with
respect to mathematics was the philosopher Hans Hahn, for whom monsters such
as continuous but nowhere differentiable functions had profound methodological
implications: ‘Again and again we have found that, even in simple and elementary
geometric questions, intuition is a wholly unreliable guide. It is impossible to permit
so unreliable an aid to serve as the starting point or basis of a mathematical disci-
pline’ (Hahn 1933, 1974). For Hahn, this mandates ‘the expulsion of intuition from
mathematical reasoning’ and ‘the complete formalization of mathematics’ (Hahn
1933, 1970). The project Hahn envisages, of ‘completely formalizing mathemat-
ics, of reducing it entirely to logic’ (Hahn 1933, 1971), was indeed a goal of much
early twentieth-century foundational work in the philosophy of mathematics. But
it foundered on deep conceptual difficulties and never much intersected with the
research priorities of mainstream mathematicians. Subsequent thought has tended
to less drastic solutions than the banishment of intuition. Feferman, for example,
draws a much more modest conclusion:
What, then, is one to say about the geometrical and topological
monsters that are supposed to demonstrate the unreliability of in-
tuition? The answer is simply that these serve as counterexamples
to intuitively expected results when certain notions are used as ex-
plications which serve various purposes well enough but which do
not have all expected properties (Feferman 2000, 322).
That is, the monsters show us the limits of our intuition, not that our intuition
should be ignored. On the contrary, intuition has an enduring place in mathemat-
ical methodology, as does the practice of pushing it to its limits: ‘it is standard
mathematical practice to seek best possible results of an expected kind, and one
way to achieve such is to make weakest possible assumptions on the given data. In
this respect the mathematical monsters serve simply to provide counter-examples
to further possible improvements’ (ibid.). This limitative role for the mathematical
monster leads us directly to Cohen’s fifth thesis.
5. ‘The monster polices the borders of the possible’
Marking limits is a further cultural use of monsters that Cohen identifies: ‘From
its position at the limits of knowing, the monster stands as a warning against explo-
ration of its uncertain demesnes’ (Cohen 1996, 12). This role has several dimensions
with mathematical counterparts. We have seen one already, in Feferman’s reflec-
tions on the limits of intuition. Another is that particularly hard problems can be
framed in monstrous terms, as a warning to mathematicians that their efforts may
be in vain. The sociologist and historian of mathematics Donald MacKenzie notes
how such notoriety attached to the four-colour conjecture, the innocent-seeming
claim that four colours suffice to colour any planar map so that no adjacent regions
are the same colour. Quoting Wolfgang Haken, one of the architects of the eventual
proof (itself a computer-assisted monster, too vast for human inspection), MacKen-
zie states that the ‘conjecture had gained a reputation as a “man-eating problem”
[whose] victims abandoned ordinary, tractable mathematics to spend years or even
decades looking for a proof or a refutation’ (MacKenzie 1999, 9). Indeed, MacKen-
zie’s history of the four-colour conjecture invokes a monster in its title, ‘Slaying the
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Kraken’, echoing the celebratory lines of the graph theorist (and occasional poet)
Bill Tutte: ‘Wolfgang Haken/Smote the Kraken/One! Two! Three! Four!/Quoth
he: “The monster is no more”’ (MacKenzie 1999, 39 f.). When the conjecture was
still open, Tutte had observed of it, ‘It is dangerous to work close to The Problem’
(quoted in MacKenzie 1999, 9). The danger is a real one: mathematicians who
devote all their effort to one big problem risk having nothing to show for it, to the
detriment of their careers.
Cohen also observes that ‘policing the boundaries of culture [is] usually in the
service of some notion of group “purity”’ (Cohen 1996, 15). Mathematics has sev-
eral notions of purity. The philosophers Mic Detlefsen and Andy Arana remark
that “‘Purity” in mathematics has generally been taken to signify a preferred rela-
tionship between the resources used to prove a theorem or solve a problem and the
resources used or needed to understand or comprehend that theorem or problem’
(Detlefsen and Arana 2011, 1). This is what is often termed ‘purity of method’,
the sense that an optimal proof should use only the resources of the field in which
the problem arose, and not detour into other areas of mathematics. Such detours
can be effective ways of tackling tough problems, but mathematicians often con-
sider it worth pursuing a pure proof, even after an otherwise satisfactory proof has
been established (Dawson 2006, 279 f.). Another sense of purity is exhibited in the
distinction between pure and applied mathematics. Here the purity emphasizes a
boundary between mathematics and other scientific and technological disciplines:
pure mathematics addresses problems that arise within mathematics; applied math-
ematics brings mathematical methods to bear on problems from elsewhere. This
boundary has always been as much political as objective: it served the institutional
purposes of increasingly professionalized nineteenth-century mathematics depart-
ments to stress the purity of their work (Ferreirós 2016, 218). Moreover, innovative
scientists and engineers have often found very practical applications for mathemat-
ical results originally considered the purest of the pure: the centrality of prime
factorization to modern cryptography is a standard example. Taken to extremes,
this sense of purity could become a pernicious ivory-tower mentality that could be
used to excuse toleration of monstrosities in the political sphere: what the historian
Herbert Mehrtens terms ‘irresponsible purity’ in his survey of mathematics in Nazi
Germany (Mehrtens 1994).
The boundary-patrolling function of monsters is also reflected in another of the
methods of monster accommodation that Lakatos documents. Rather than change
the definitions so that the monster is excluded, as in monster-barring, a more pro-
ductive approach may be to determine where the conjecture holds. This project of
constructing a boundary to enclose the safe cases rather than to exclude the mon-
sters, Lakatos calls exception-barring, or rather ‘a whole continuum of exception-
barring attitudes’ (Lakatos 1976, 24). He distinguishes primitive exception-barring,
which just compartmentalizes the proof and its exceptions without any attempt to
reconcile the two, from exception-barring strategies that are informed by the proof
at issue. For these exception-barrers the proof at least provides ‘some inspiration
for stating the conditions which determine a safe domain’, and at best ‘a very
fine delineation of the prohibited area’ based upon ‘a careful analysis of the proof’
(ibid.). Such an exception-barrer maintains that
no conjecture is generally valid, but only valid in a certain re-
stricted domain that excludes the exceptions. I am against dubbing
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these exceptions ‘monsters’ or ‘pathological cases’. That would
amount to the methodological decision not to consider these as
interesting examples in their own right, worthy of a separate in-
vestigation (ibid.).
This is a significant methodological improvement over monster-barring, but it is
not the final word. The lingering problem is that addressing some exceptions does
not ensure that all exceptions have been addressed. As Poincaré observed of such a
manoeuvre, ‘We have put a fence around the herd to protect it from the wolves but
we do not know whether some wolves were not already within the fence’ (quoted
in Kline 1972, 1186).
Bloor sees exception-barring as characteristic of Douglas’s hierarchical cultures:
‘large, diverse but stable system[s] of institutions’, with
an extensive repertoire of methods for responding to anomaly and
for their reclassification. They will be fitted in somewhere, or the
classificatory scheme will be expanded. Complicated rites of atone-
ment; promotions and demotions; special exceptions; distinctions,
assimilations and legal fictions will abound. And pervading the
use of all these expedients there will be a vague sense of overriding
unity (Bloor 1978, 254).
This neatly intersects with Cohen’s remark that ‘The monster of prohibition . . .
validated a tight, hierarchical system of naturalized leadership and control where
every man had a functional place’ (Cohen 1996, 13 f.).
6. ‘Fear of the monster is really a kind of desire’
Cohen tells us that ‘The monster also attracts’ (Cohen 1996, 16). This is clearly
true of some mathematical monsters, at least for some mathematicians: the warn-
ings against monster problems we encountered in the last section would be unnec-
essary if no one were drawn to such problems. This thesis may be less obvious
for the mathematical monsters we have discussed most, the anomalies and patho-
logical cases. Certainly, some mathematicians, with Hermite, ‘turn aside with a
shudder of horror’. But for other mathematicians ‘the linking of monstrosity with
the forbidden makes the monster all the more appealing as a temporary egress from
constraint. . . . We distrust and loathe the monster at the same time we envy its
freedom, and perhaps its sublime despair’ (Cohen 1996, 17). The concept of the
sublime may be key to understanding this combination of fear and desire. In one
of the most influential analyses of the sublime, Edmund Burke characterizes it as
follows:
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger,
that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about
terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a
source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest
emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. When danger or
pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight,
and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain
modifications, they may be, and they are delightful (Burke 1756,
13 f.).
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Many informal reflections by mathematicians on the highs and lows of their profes-
sional lives could be framed in terms of the sublime, and sometimes these allusions
are made explicit. For example, the mathematician John Baez describes ‘moments
of exaltation that come from suddenly glimpsing a terrifyingly grand vista: some-
times shrouded in mist, sometimes lit by a lightning-bolt of insight’ (Baez 2008).
This directly echoes Burke’s observation that ‘Greatness of dimension is a powerful
cause of the sublime’ (Burke 1756, 51). Burke presumably intended ‘dimension’ in
the sense of scale—great extent along a given dimension—not in the sense of higher-
dimensions, since the fourth dimension was not theorized until a century after his
death. The Monster group, however, has greatness of dimension in both senses.
Its discovery has been described as ‘one of the most spectacular and mysterious
mathematical achievements of the past fifty years’ (Simons 2005, 334).
To gain some sense of what the Monster group is, and why it has attracted so
much attention, we will need to venture briefly into group theory, the mathematical
field in which it originates. Technically, a group is a set, say G, acted on by an
operation, say ∗, for which the following axioms hold:
Closure: g ∗ h ∈ G for all g, h ∈ G.
Associativity: (g ∗ h) ∗ k = g ∗ (h ∗ k).
Identity: There is an identity element e ∈ G such that g ∗ e = e ∗ g = g for
all g ∈ G.
Inverse: For all g ∈ G there exists g−1 ∈ G such that g ∗ g−1 = g−1 ∗ g = e.
To see how this works, take a letter, say P, and think about some of the transfor-
mations we could perform upon it. For example, we could turn it upside down,
P
,
or back to front, P, or both at once,
P
. Counting leaving the original P alone as
a null transformation, this gives us four transformations which comprise a group
(known as the Klein four group, or K4). We may think of them in terms of the
distinct symbols that result from applying each to P: (P,
P
, P,
P
). These comprise
the elements of this group. Its operation is just performing one transformation af-
ter another. For example, if we turn the letter upside down and then upside down
again, it ends up back where it began. So this transformation is its own inverse (as
are the other members of K4), since leaving alone is clearly the identity element.
With a bit more thought we can see that the elements are associative and closed,
since they represent every possible combination of vertical and horizontal reflection:
either, both, or neither.
As far as P is concerned, none of these transformations is a symmetry, since P
is clearly transformed. But suppose we had applied the transformations instead to
X or H. Then (at least for sans serif fonts) the letters would remain unchanged.
Hence the Klein four group represents (some of) the symmetries of these letters.
In contrast, consider a different set of four transformations, those resulting from a
quarter-turn, a half-turn, a three-quarter-turn, and a full turn: (
P
,
P
, P, P). This
is a different four-element group, the cyclic group of order four, Z4. We can see
that it is different by observing that H would not be symmetrical under this group
(two of the operations would give us H). But we can also see that the two groups
have two elements in common, (
P
, P). This is also a group, the cyclic group of
order two, Z2. The existence of this subgroup means that neither K4 nor Z4 are
simple. However, the only subgroups of Z2 are trivial: Z2 itself and the identity
element on its own. Hence Z2 is simple, as is Zp for any prime number p. Thus the
cyclic groups of prime order comprise a family of infinitely many simple groups.
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There are several other families of simple groups, also with infinitely many mem-
bers. One of the most impressive results of late twentieth-century mathematics
was the classification of finite simple groups, which comprises literally thousands
of pages of work, written by scores of mathematicians over several decades. This
classification shows that every simple group of finite order must belong to one of
these families, or to a small cluster of outlaws: the sporadic groups (Simons 2005,
334). These are finite simple groups that do not belong to any of the families. In
the 1860s and 70s, the French mathematician Émile Léonard Mathieu discovered
the five sporadic groups that bear his name (listed here with their orders):
M11 2
4 · 32 · 5 · 11 = 7, 920
M12 2
6 · 33 · 5 · 11 = 95, 040
M22 2
7 · 32 · 5 · 7 · 11 = 443, 520
M23 2
7 · 32 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 23 = 10, 200, 960
M24 2
10 · 33 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 23 = 244, 823, 040
Until the 1930s it remained controversial whether the Mathieu groups existed and,
if so, whether they were really simple (Ronan 2006, 131). That no further sporadic
groups were found in this period may have increased suspicions. But in 1965 the
first of a brief spate of sporadic groups turned up. Several of the new sporadic
groups were actually smaller than some of the Mathieu groups, but some of them
were very big indeed, notably the Baby Monster, which has order
241 · 313 · 56 · 72 · 11 · 13 · 17 · 19 · 23 · 31 · 47 =
4154781481226426191177580544000000
≈ 4× 1033
and the Monster, of order
246 · 320 · 59 · 76 · 112 · 133 · 17 · 19 · 23 · 29 · 31 · 41 · 47 · 59 · 71 =
808017424794512875886459904961710757005754368000000000
≈ 8× 1053
The Monster is monstrous not only for its size, but for its uncanny properties.
Specifically, it turns out to have profound connections to other, seemingly quite
unrelated areas of mathematics. The discovery of these connections began as an
apparent coincidence: a close relationship between two series of large numbers,
the ‘character degrees’ of the Monster and the coefficients of the j-function, which
expresses a property of complex numbers (Ronan 2006, 192). This, and other
unexpected connections between the Monster and number theory, were dubbed
‘monstrous moonshine’ by Conway, one of the pioneers of this field, from the slang
term ‘for “insubstantial or unreal”, “idle talk or speculation”, “an illusive shadow”
. . . to give the impression that matters here are dimly lit, and that [this technique]
is “distilling information illegally”’ (Gannon 2006, 7). With collaborator Simon
Norton, Conway published a series of conjectures extrapolating from the idea that
these similarities could not just be coincidence (Conway and Norton 1979). The
eventual proof of these conjectures by Richard Borcherds, a former student of Con-
way, earned Borcherds a Fields medal, the most prestigious award in mathematics
(Ronan 2006, 225).
It is worth noting that, although 8× 1053 is by many measures a big number, it
is not especially large by the standards of many mathematicians. Much larger finite
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numbers are employed in some fields, such as combinatorics, some of them requiring
innovative notations just to write down, since they are practically inexpressible in
the standard notation of exponentiation. Even these numbers are negligible by
comparison with infinity itself. As Burke observed, infinity ‘has a tendency to fill
the mind with that sort of delightful horror, which is the most genuine effect, and
truest test of the sublime’ (Burke 1756, 52). For much of mathematical history it
was accepted wisdom that the infinite could only be potential, not actual. That is,
infinity might represent a never-to-be-attained limit, but it could not actually be
assigned to completed sets of things. That perspective was overturned in the late
nineteenth century by the German mathematician Georg Cantor, who devised an
account of sets of infinite size. This would not be all that interesting a theory if
there was only one infinite number, but Cantor showed that this cannot be so.
With finite numbers, we often neglect to distinguish ordinal numbers (such as
first, second, third) from cardinal numbers (such as one, two, three). With infinite
numbers the distinction becomes much more important. The natural numbers
{1, 2, 3, . . . } are indeed equinumerous with (have the same cardinal number as)
many other sets of numbers including the integers {. . . ,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . },
the rationals (which can all be expressed as ratios of natural numbers) and the
algebraic numbers (which are all expressible as roots of polynomial equations). That
is, they all have the same cardinal number, ℵ0. But the set of real numbers, that is
every number that can be expressed as a decimal expansion (possibly itself infinite in
length), has demonstrably more members than there are natural numbers. In other
words, it is uncountable. Of course, once we have two infinite numbers, we can start
looking for more. Since Cantor’s day, ever more remote families of infinite cardinals
have been discovered, so much so that set theorists now routinely distinguish ‘large
cardinals’ from comparative minnows such as those studied by Cantor. Many of
these families have exotic or grandiose names, although the mathematician Rudy
Rucker observes that
It is interesting to note that the smaller large cardinals have much
grander names than the really big ones. Down at the bottom you
have the self-styled inaccessible and indescribable cardinals loudly
celebrating their size, while above, one of the largest cardinals
quietly remarks that it is measurable, and the largest cardinals
known simply point out past themselves with the comment that
they are extendible (Rucker 1982, 265).
This observation is somewhat undercut by further developments: beyond the ex-
tendible lie almost huge, huge, and superhuge cardinals (Kanamori 2009, 331).
The development of a mathematics of the infinite was not without controversy.
Some mathematicians regarded such work as intrinsically fanciful: internally con-
sistent, perhaps, but devoid of any meaningful application. Some even went as
far as to propose that such work should be jettisoned altogether. This provoked
a famous riposte from the doyen of German mathematics, David Hilbert: ‘No one
shall drive us out of the paradise which Cantor has created for us’ (Hilbert 1926,
191). This controversy finds an echo in Cohen’s remark that ‘The habitations of
the monsters . . . are also realms of happy fantasy, horizons of liberation’ (Cohen
1996, 18).
16 ANDREW ABERDEIN
7. ‘The monster stands at the threshold. . . of becoming’
Cohen concludes his foray into monster culture by stating that ‘These monsters
ask us how we perceive the world . . . They ask us why we have created them’
(Cohen 1996, 20). In §1 we encountered Poincaré invoking biological terminology
to complain of the teratologic museum confronting the mathematician. Modern
biology has gone beyond teratology to teratogeny, ‘the art of producing monstrous
forms’ (Blumberg 2009, 254). The creation of monsters—and attending to the
questions that they have to ask—is also key to their role in mathematical discovery.
Proofs and Refutations contains exactly one reference to biological literature
(Lakatos 1976, 22). Lakatos cites the early twentieth-century biologist Richard
Goldschmidt, remembered for his now discredited idea of monsters as the source of
new species, and particularly for his reference to ‘hopeful monsters, monsters which
would start a new evolutionary line if fitting into some empty environmental niche’
(Goldschmidt 1933, 547). Goldschmidt was reacting against a growing consensus
in evolutionary biology that only external, environmental factors were relevant to
the understanding of organisms. From that perspective, monsters were irrelevant,
since they were presumed to be genetic dead-ends. Much more recently evolutionary
developmental biology (evo-devo, for short) has rehabilitated monsters—as sources
of information, not of new species. As Pere Alberch, one of the originators of
evo-devo puts it,
I propose that it may be advantageous to turn to non-functional,
grossly maladapted, teratologies when studying the properties of
internal factors in evolution. These major deviations from normal
development result in forms that are often lethal, and always sig-
nificantly less well adapted than their progenitors. Therefore, one
expects monsters to be consistently eliminated by selection. This is
a useful property because if, in spite of very strong negative selec-
tion, teratologies are generated in a discrete and recurrent manner,
this order has to be a reflection of the internal properties of the
developmental system (Alberch 1989, 28).
Lakatos draws a similar moral: ‘if we want to learn about anything really deep, we
have to study it not in its “normal”, regular, usual form, but in its critical state, in
fever, in passion. If you want to know the normal healthy body, study it when it
is abnormal, when it is ill. If you want to know functions, study their singularities.
If you want to know ordinary polyhedra, study their lunatic fringe’ (Lakatos 1976,
23). This insight lies behind the methodology that he judges most successful of all
those he surveys. He calls this the method of proofs and refutations, but it has
also been dubbed ‘monster-assimilating’ (Caneva 1981, 108). The crucial insight
is that monsters should be welcomed as a means of deepening proofs. A monster-
assimilator reacts to a counterexample to a proof by adding an extra lemma to
the proof that the counterexample refutes. This form of proof analysis leads to a
revised conjecture and ultimately a deeper grasp of the concepts contained within
the original conjecture (Lakatos 1976, 127). For the Euler conjecture, the extra
lemmas specify that there must be a way of travelling along edges between any pair
of vertices (refuted by the hollow cube) and the surface must be simply connected
(any loop we draw on it could be tightened to a point; refuted by the picture frame,
Fig. 1). But the proof analysis yields further dividends: we may generalize the result
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by dropping these lemmas; in doing so, V − E + F will not always be 2; instead
it becomes an Euler characteristic that classifies many different sorts of surface.
Surfaces with Euler characteristic 2 are those which are topologically equivalent
to a sphere (that is, they could be ‘inflated’ into spheres), whereas surfaces with
Euler characteristic 0, such as the picture frame, are topologically equivalent to a
torus, or bagel. Thus, by attending closely to monsters, a conjecture which might
have seemed a mere mathematical curiosity motivates a profound and wide-ranging
classification.
Bloor links such successful deployment of monster-assimilating to Douglas’s in-
dividualistic cultures:
We must ask what social forms exert a pressure towards innovation
and novelty, and encourage transactions across the boundaries of
existing classificatory schemes, dissolving them in change? Where
is discontinuity more desired than regularity? Where can mistakes
be tolerated and risks taken? Where is the tension most acutely felt
between the missing of opportunities due to a reluctance to change,
and missing them because of lack of sustained application? Which
societies embody this contradiction in their very structure? The
answer is: individualistic, pluralistic, competitive, and pragmatic
social forms (Bloor 1978, 256).
These are the cultural conditions in which monsters may receive their due.
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